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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 11-1110
___________
JAIR IZQUIERDO,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A099-683-662)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Henry S. Dogin
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 17, 2011
Before: SLOVITER, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 24, 2011)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Jair Izquierdo petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals‟
(“BIA”) decision denying his motion to reopen his removal proceedings. For the reasons
that follow, we will grant the petition, vacate the BIA‟s decision, and remand for further
proceedings.

I.
Because we write for the parties, who are familiar with the background of
this case, we discuss that background only to the extent necessary to rule on the instant
petition. Izquierdo, a native and citizen of Peru, entered the United States as a
nonimmigrant visitor in October 2001. He ultimately stayed beyond the time allowed
under his visa, and was placed in removal proceedings in 2006. He conceded his
removability and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In support of his application, he claimed that he
feared returning to Peru on account of his being gay.
In October 2006, after a hearing on the merits, the Immigration Judge (“IJ”)
denied Izquierdo‟s application. In his decision, the IJ noted that “[t]here are many
instances where gays [in Peru] are not only discriminated against, but there‟s actual
physical beatings at the hands of the authorities. There‟s also evidence that the
authorities stand around and allow gays to be harmed.” (J.A. at 138.) Despite these
findings, the IJ concluded that he could not find a pattern or practice of persecution
against gays in Peru “until I have a finding by an appellate court or a legislative fiend
[sic].” (See id. at 146-47.)
In June 2008, the BIA upheld the IJ‟s denial of relief. Although the BIA
determined that the IJ had erred in stating that he could not grant relief on Izquierdo‟s
pattern or practice claim due to the absence of any controlling authority, the BIA
concluded that this error was harmless because the record did not establish such a pattern
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or practice. In support of this conclusion, the BIA emphasized that
while the [IJ] referred generally to beatings of gays and police
inaction, such incidents are reported primarily in the older
articles in the record, some of which date back more than 12
years. We note that most of the articles submitted by
[Izquierdo] are more than 5 years old and thus are not
reflective of current conditions for homosexuals in Peru, and
the more recent articles, from 2006, relate primarily to
incidents against transvestite activists.
(Id. at 124 (citations omitted).) The BIA also highlighted several excerpts from country
reports reflecting positive strides made in Peru regarding the treatment of gays.
Izquierdo subsequently petitioned this Court to review the BIA‟s decision;
we denied that petition in November 2009. See Izquierdo v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 352
F. App‟x 682 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). In November 2010, he moved the BIA to
reopen his removal proceedings, claiming that conditions for gays in Peru had worsened
since his October 2006 merits hearing before the IJ. In support of this motion, Izquierdo
submitted the U.S. State Department‟s 2009 Country Report on Human Rights Practices
for Peru, as well as various articles and other sources.
On December 17, 2010, the BIA denied Izquierdo‟s motion to reopen in a
one-page decision. The BIA concluded that
[t]he evidence proffered with [Izquierdo‟s] present motion
does not reflect materially changed country conditions for
homosexuals in his native Peru since this case was before the
[IJ] in October of 2006. Rather, such evidence describes a
continuance of the on-going and volatile circumstances that
gave rise to [his] first claim, a claim that was previously
denied by both the [IJ] and the [BIA].
Moreover,
[Izquierdo‟s] generalized claim of increased harassment,
3

discrimination, and violence towards homosexuals in Peru is
insufficient to establish his prima facie eligibility for asylum,
withholding of removal, and [CAT] relief. The country
information submitted along with [his] motion does not
sufficiently demonstrate that there exists a reasonable
possibility that [he] would be targeted for harm rising to the
level of persecution on account of a protected ground. Nor
does such evidence sufficiently demonstrate that [he] would
more likely than not face torture in Peru. The evidence
presented does not make a prima facie showing that the
government of Peru would torture or acquiesce in the torture
of [him].
(J.A. at 2 (citations omitted).) Izquierdo now seeks review of this most recent BIA
decision.1
II.
An alien generally must file a motion to reopen within 90 days of the entry
of the final order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i). There is no such time
limit, however, if the alien‟s motion “is based on changed country conditions arising in
the country of nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered, if such
evidence is material and was not available and would not have been discovered or
presented at the previous proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii). We review the
BIA‟s denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d
398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005), and “will uphold that determination if it is „supported by
reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.‟”

1

We have jurisdiction over Izquierdo‟s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).
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Zheng v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 549 F.3d 260, 266 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting INS v. EliasZacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 481 (1992)).
In this case, the BIA articulated two independent grounds for denying
Izquierdo‟s motion to reopen. First, the BIA concluded that he had failed to establish
materially changed country conditions in Peru. Second, the BIA concluded that he had
failed to establish prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal, or CAT
relief. As explained below, the reasoning underlying both of these conclusions is flawed.
The BIA concluded that Izquierdo had failed to establish materially
changed country conditions because his new evidence merely “describes a continuance of
the on-going and volatile circumstances that gave rise to [his] first claim.” (J.A. at 2.)
This reasoning, without more, simply does not square with the BIA‟s earlier findings. In
its earlier decision, the BIA gave no indication that “volatile circumstances” were “ongoing” in Peru. To the contrary, the BIA found that most of the evidence that had been
presented to the IJ was outdated and thus “not reflective of current conditions for
homosexuals in Peru.” (See id. at 124.) Additionally, the BIA highlighted several
excerpts from country reports reflecting positive developments in Peru regarding the
treatment of gays.
As for the BIA‟s conclusion that Izquierdo had failed to establish prima
facie eligibility for relief, it appears that the BIA reached that conclusion by assessing the
wrong claim. Izquierdo‟s motion to reopen claimed that he was entitled to relief based on
a pattern or practice of persecution against gays in Peru. It appears, however, that the
5

BIA evaluated his claim as though it was based on individualized persecution, for the
BIA concluded that the evidence “does not sufficiently demonstrate that there exists a
reasonable possibility that [Izquierdo] would be targeted for harm rising to the level of
persecution on account of a protected ground.” (See id. at 2 (emphasis added).) The
Government, in a footnote in its brief, essentially concedes this error.2
Given the above-noted flaws in the BIA‟s analysis, we cannot uphold its
December 17, 2010 decision on either of the two grounds articulated by the agency.
Although Izquierdo urges us to hold that he has both established materially changed
country conditions and prima facie eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal, we
will instead remand the matter so that the BIA can properly evaluate his motion to

2

The Government states that

[s]hould the Court disagree with [the Government‟s] argument and find a
change in country conditions warranting reopening, the Court should
remand the case for the agency to consider Izquierdo‟s claim that he made
out a prima facie case of a “pattern and practice” of persecution. See INS v.
Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16-17 (2002) (holding that this Court must remand to
the Board to allow it to address in the first instance an issue that it has not
yet considered); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186-87 (2006) (same).
(Resp‟t‟s Br. 16 n.1.)
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reopen.3 We express no opinion on his ability to prevail on that motion.
In light of the above, we will grant Izquierdo‟s petition for review, vacate
the BIA‟s December 17, 2010 decision, and remand the matter to the BIA for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion.
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Because we conclude that the BIA examined the wrong claim in determining that
Izquierdo had failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief, we need not address his
argument that the BIA‟s prima facie eligibility analysis employed an “excessively
rigorous standard.” We trust that, on remand, the BIA will apply the proper standard.
See Shardar v. Att‟y Gen. of the U.S., 503 F.3d 308, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (explaining that,
to establish prima facie eligibility for relief, an alien moving to reopen “must produce
objective evidence showing a reasonable likelihood that he can establish that he is
entitled to relief”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
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